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Department of State

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Action

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Classification

Control: 2214

Rec'd: MARCH 3, 1961
1:17 PM

Info

FROM: DJAKARTA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2508, MARCH 3, 3 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2508, REPEATED INFORMATION CINCPAC 332,

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

EMBTel 2154

EMBASSY DOES NOT CONSIDER NECESSARY AT THIS TIME TO RE-SUBMIT ANALYSIS OF PROS AND CONS OF NEW GUINEA QUESTION IN ORDER TO SPELL OUT RECOMMENDATION OF SEVEN-POINT PROGRAM CONTAINED REFTel. DEPT HAS MADE EXHAUSTIVE STUDIES, IS FULLY INFORMED OF FACT THAT ALL INDO FOREIGN POLICY, MUCH OF INDO INTERNAL POLITICAL LIFE, REVOLVES AROUND THIS CARDINAL ISSUE.

EMBASSY WOULD LIKE, HOWEVER, TO POINT OUT PRESENT APPEARS TO BE MOST FAVORABLE MOMENT FOR TAKING INITIATIVE TO FIND SOLUTION; INITIATIVE WHICH UNLIKELY TO COME FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE HAVING EQUAL AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE WITH BOTH PARTIES.

THERE HAS CLEARLY BEEN CREATED A DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE OVER THIS QUESTION THAN HAS EXISTED AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST. WE NOW HAVE THE PICTURE OF LUNS, OTHER DUTCH LEADERS, ON ONE HAND, SUBANDRIO AND COMPANY ON THE OTHER, CONDUCTING, HOWEVER INDIRECTLY, A SORT OF PUBLIC EXCHANGE ON THIS ISSUE IN LIEU OF DIRECT DISCUSSION. FURTHER, EFFORTS OF RAHMAN HAVE ATTRACTED FAR MORE INTEREST ON PART OF BOTH DUTCH AND INDONESIANS THAN MIGHT REASONABLY HAVE BEEN EXPECTED A YEAR OR TWO AGO. FOR ALMOST FIRST TIME ADVERSARIES HAVE BEGUN TO SPEAK IN TERMS OF FINITE POSITIONS, WHICH ARE ALWAYS SUSCEPTIBLE TO BARGAINING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE INDOS ONCE

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By GPO NARA Date 8/4/00

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-2- 2508, MARCH 3, 3 PM FROM DJAKARTA

CONTENDED THAT UN TRUSTEESHIP WOULD BE ANA THEME UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.

NOW, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT GONE SO FAR AS TO BE WILLING TO CALL A TRUSTEESHIP A TRUSTEESHIP, THEY TALK IN TERMS OF "ONE OR TWO YEARS" OF SOME KIND OF INTERREGNUM AS BEING ACCEPTABLE.

WHILE EMBASSY WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE TO ANALYZE POSITION OF NETHERLANDS, WE HAVE OBSERVED PUBLIC REPORTS, PRIVATE COMMENTS, SUGGESTING NETHERLANDS THINKING IN TERMS OF 10-YEAR OR SIMILAR PERIOD TUTELAGE WITH SELF-DETERMINATION AS GOAL. EMBASSY SUBMITS THESE POSITIONS, HOWEVER FAR APART, ARE OF NATURE SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMPROMISE. MEANWHILE, AUSTRALIANS APPEAR TO STAND ON POSITION TAKEN ABOUT YEAR AGO THAT THEY WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH ANY ARRANGEMENT REACHED BY PEACEFUL MEANS BETWEEN DUTCH, INDOS.

THERE IS FURTHER INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT INDO WAR TALK HAS BECOME SOMEWHAT MUTED IN RECENT WEEKS WHILE DUTCH SPEAK PUBLICLY, AT LEAST, WITH MUCH MORE CONFIDENCE THAT INDOS ARE NOT PLANNING SEIZE WEST NEW GUINEA BY FORCE.

EMBASSY INCLINED TO DOUBT, HOWEVER, ONCE VALID OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ABOUT FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION BETWEEN DUTCH, INDOS ANY LONGER FEASIBLE. INDEED, SUCH CONFRONTATION MORE LIKELY TO EXACERBATE SITUATION THAN TO AMELIORATE IT. HONEST BROKER NECESSARY. WHILE SUCH ROLE POSSIBLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR US, US COULD AT LEAST BE OF ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING ONE, SUCH AS UN.

DEPT IN BEST POSITION TO SELECT COURSE OF ACTION. FORTHCOMING VISIT OF SUKARNO WOULD PROVIDE IDEAL OPPORTUNITY TO BROACH NEW PLAN FOR OVER-ALL US INITIATIVE. EMBASSY URGES THEREFORE, THAT DETERMINATION OF COURSE OF ACTION, TOGETHER WITH ANY PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION WITH NETHERLANDS, AUSTRALIA, BRITISH OR OTHERS, SUCH AS MALAYANS, BE EXPEDITED WITH THAT IN VIEW.

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-3- 2508, MARCH 3, 3 PM FROM DJAKARTA

UNLESS NEW GUINEA QUESTION CAN BE PROMPTLY REMOVED AS
SOURCE OF SOVIET STRENGTH AND US WEAKNESS, AS INCIPIENT
CAUSE OF WAR AND AS PLATFORM FOR VARIETY OF UNHEALTHFUL
ISMS WITHIN INDONESIA, OUR BEST EFFORTS IN ANY OTHER
DIRECTION WILL FAIL TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES HERE.

JONES

HC

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Action

Classification

Control: 4586

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Rec'd: MARCH 7, 1961
7:11 PM

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Info

FROM: DJAKARTA

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 2536, MARCH 7, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2536, CINCPAC 333

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IOP EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2154

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OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDO HAS LOST MUCH OF
PROMISING 1958-59 MOMENTUM IN STRENGTHENING ANTI-COMMUNIST
CAUSE. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS, ONLY ONE OF
WHICH IS COMPETITION PROVIDED BY OPEN-HANDED LARGESSE OF
SOVIET MILITARY SERVICES. WHILE THIS PRESENTLY BEYOND
OUR CONTROL, OTHER REASONS SUBJECT TO CORRECTIVE ACTION BY US

MOST IMPORTANT CORRECTIVE ACTION NECESSARY IS TO REVISE OUR
WHOLE APPROACH TO INDO ARMED FORCES, ABANDONING DOCTRINE
OF "TOKEN" AID IN FAVOR OF WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION BETWEEN
EQUALS. OUR LIMITED AID PROGRAM WAS CONCEIVED AS APPLICATION
OF CARROT TECHNIQUE. IF INDO ARMED FORCES EFFECTIVELY
ANTI-COMMUNIST, WE WOULD REWARD THIS BY LIMITED AMOUNT OF
ASSISTANCE, THEN STAND BACK OBSERVE RESULTS. A LITTLE MORE
ANTI-COMMUNISM, A LITTLE MORE AID, ETC., HOLDING OUT PROMISE
OF FULL COOPERATION IN DISTANT FUTURE.

INDONESIANS, OF COURSE, QUICKLY BECAME AWARE FROM OUR PERFORMANCE
THAT SOMETHING OF KIND WAS IN WIND, GALLING THEIR NATIONALISTIC
SENSIBILITIES TO UTMOST. MEANWHILE, WE INSISTED ON AID
MECHANICS DEVISED PRIMARILY FOR APPLICATION TO SUCH COUNTRIES
AS THAILAND, REPUBLIC OF CHINA, SOUTH KOREA, PHILIPPINES.
IT WAS US THAT SET FORCE GOALS WITHIN WHICH AID REQUESTS
WOULD BE FIXED. THESE FORCE GOALS, OF COURSE, HAD TO MAKE
"MILITARY SENSE"

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-2- 2536, MARCH 7, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM DJAKARTA

"MILITARY SENSE" FROM POINT OF VIEW OF MILITARY MEN.
AT SAME TIME, WE WERE STRICTLY ENJOINED FROM TALKING TO
INDOS IN TERMS OF ASSISTANCE FARTHER AHEAD THAN CURRENT
FISCAL YEAR, WHILE SEEKING ON OTHER HAND TO DRAW FROM THEM
FIRM ESTIMATES AS TO THEIR OWN INTENTIONS.

ALL THIS HAS BEEN BEWILDERING ENOUGH TO INDOS. WHEN UNEXPLAINED
DELAYS IN DELIVERIES, FAILURE TO ANSWER SIMPLE QUESTIONS ABOUT
US WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY SUCH MUNDANE REQUIREMENTS AS
MARINE CORPS RIFLES ARE ADDED TO PICTURE, IT IS EASY TO
UNDERSTAND WHY INDOS DESIRE ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF MILITARY
SUPPLY. (RIFLES REMOVED AS CURRENT CASE IN POINT BY DEPTEL
1368). AS THOUGH THIS LACK OF FLEXIBILITY WERE NOT ENOUGH,
ADDITIONAL HANDICAP OF POLITICALLY INSPIRED LIMITATIONS ON TYPES
OF WEAPONS WHICH CAN BE SOLD TO INDO, LIMITATIONS CLEARLY
INTENDED MEET WISHES OF ENEMY DUTCH, HAS SETTLED QUESTION
EVEN IN MINDS OF MOST PRO-AMERICAN OFFICERS.

SOVBLOC IS, OF COURSE, MEANWHILE USING ITS MILITARY AID
OFFERS IN SHREWD ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE ARMY/NAVY FAITH IN ITS
OWN LEADERSHIP WHICH UP TO NOW IS SOLE FORCE ABLE PREVENT
COMMUNIST TAKEOVER INDO. BLOC STRATEGY IS TO SHOW ARMY/
NAVY THAT THEIR PRESENT MILITARY LEADERS, IN SPITE OF ANTI-
COMMUNIST POSTURE, MUST WHEN CHIPS DOWN TURN TO BLOC TO MEET
REAL NEEDS ARMED FORCES.

IN THIS SITUATION IT IS FUTILE FOR US TO TRY ANY LONGER
TO STRAIGHTJACKET INDO ARMY/NAVY BY OUR FORCE GOALS AND
POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS.

INSTEAD, OUR MILITARY AID PROGRAM SHOULD BE RAPIDLY REVISED
TO: 1) STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE IN US ON PART OF ANTI-COMMUNIST
INDO MILITARY LEADERSHIP; 2) PREVENT SOVIETS FROM BEING SOLE
SOURCE OF CONSPICUOUS EQUIPMENT (SUCH AS OPERATIONAL
AIRCRAFT, AMPHIBIOUS TANKS, HEAVY AA WEAPONS, COMBAT SHIPS)
WHICH CREATES IMPRESSION ARMED FORCES MUST RELY ON THEM;
AND 3) SUPPLY SOME OF MODERN, COMPLEX EQUIPMENT INDOS WANT
SO AS TO REDUCE NUMBERS OF FUTURE INDO MILITARY LEADERS AND

TECHNICIANS

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-3- 2536, MARCH 7, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM DJAKARTA

TECHNICIANS TRAINED IN BLOC OR BY BLOC MISSION IN INDO.
INCENTIVE FOR THEM TO TRAIN IN US OR BY US TRAINING
TEAMS HERE WOULD THUS BE PROVIDED.

FOREGOING PROGRAM IS BASED ON RECOGNITION OF FACT FUNDAMENTAL
PURPOSE IN PROVIDING AID IS POLITICAL: NAMELY STRENGTHENING
ANTI-COMMUNIST MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THAT MEANS WE MUST BASE
FUTURE DECISIONS RE TYPE AND SIZE EQUIPMENT ON INDO'S OWN
CONCEPT OF ROLES AND MISSIONS, WHICH NOT CONFINED TO INTERNAL
SECURITY ALONE. WE CAN NO LONGER, IN ANY EVENT, FORESTALL
INDOS FROM DEVELOPING THE STRENGTH TO OUST DUTCH FROM WNG
OR FROM BUILDING KIND OF FORCES THEY CONSIDER THEY REQUIRE.
LIKE OTHER AMBITIOUS BUT INSECURE NEW COUNTRIES, THEY ARE
CONVINCED STRONG ARMED FORCES ESSENTIAL TO CONSOLIDATION
NATIONHOOD AND ESTABLISHMENT PRESTIGE.

WHILE WE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT MATCH BLOC AID IN
AMOUNT, WE SHOULD APPRECIATE AND RESPOND SYMPATHETICALLY TO
REASONABLE DETERMINATION INDO MILITARY LEADERS TO HAVE SIZE
AND QUANTITY FORCES APPROPRIATE TO THIS SIXTH LARGEST NATION,
LOCATED ON VULNERABLE FLANK OF HIGHLY STRATEGIC AREA OF INCREASING
SIGNIFICANCE AND WHOSE NATURAL ENEMY, AS EVEN FONMIN ADMITS
PRIVATELY, IS SAME AS THAT OF US AND ITS ASIAN ALLIES: NAMELY
COMMUNIST CHINA.

WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE INDO, UNLIKE MOST OTHER NATIONS RECEIVING
MAP AID, HAS NO COMMITMENT TO MUTUAL DEFENSE OBJECTIVES, DOES
NOT CONSIDER THAT ITS FORCES ARE PART OF US GRAND STRATEGY, AND
THEREFORE CONDITIONS HERE

JONES

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Classification

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Rec'd: MARCH 7, 1961
9:53 PM

Info

FROM: DJAKARTA

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2536, MARCH 7, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2536, CINCPAC 333

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DO NOT CONFORM TO USUAL FORMAT FOR MAAG REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS. ADJUSTMENT OF OUR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO THIS SITUATION IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED. ON POSITIVE SIDE, TO IMPLEMENT ADJUSTMENT IN PROGRAM, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND: 1) EARLY CONVERSION OF TOKEN PROGRAM ESTABLISHED TO MEET NEEDS EXISTING IN 1958 INTO FULL SCALE PROGRAMS; AND 2) AUTHORIZATION MILTAG TO DISCUSS FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM, ON NON-COMMITMENT BASIS, WITH INDO MILITARY LEADERS IN ORDER PERMIT TIMELY REVISIONS WHICH MAY HELP REDUCE EQUIPMENT TO BE PROCURED FROM SOVIETS.

PROGRAM INCREASE SHOULD PERMIT SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT STRONGLY DESIRED BY NASUTION, JANI AND STAFF, SUCH AS ARMORED CARS AND LIGHT TANKS, WHICH IF NOT OBTAINABLE OTHERWISE, SHOULD BE SUPPLIED BY US OFFSHORE PURCHASE. INCREASE ALSO SHOULD SUPPORT MARTADINATA'S ULTIMATE 60,000-STRONG NAVY. SIMILAR EXAMPLE OF REVISED PROGRAM CONTENT WOULD BE PROVISION OF SOME OF JET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DESCRIBED BY NURTANIO (AIRA C-109 DTG260339Z OCT), AS WELL AS HEAVY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT ARMY LEADERSHIP STRONGLY DESIRES AND NOW REPORTEDLY PLANNING OBTAIN FROM SOVIET SOURCES. WE SHOULD ALSO IMMEDIATELY AUTHORIZE DIRECT PURCHASE OTHER US MILITARY EQUIPMENT ON FAVORABLE TERMS, AS INDOS WILLING PAY IN HARD CURRENCY FOR SOME OF EQUIPMENT THEY NEED.

IT IS, OF COURSE, NOT NECESSARY THAT ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT BEGIN ARRIVING

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-2- 2536, MARCH 7, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM DJAKARTA

BEGIN ARRIVING IMMEDIATELY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS EVIDENCE OF NEW APPROACH AS MANIFESTED IN ABILITY PROVIDE COMMITMENTS TO BEGIN SUPPLYING DESIRED ITEMS WITHIN REASONABLE TIME. THIS, OF COURSE, RAISES QUESTION ABILITY INDO ARMED FORCES TO UTILIZE. WHILE THEY HAVE FAR TO GO, ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY HAS IMPROVED. FURTHER, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT DEMONSTRATION SINCERE US INTENTION PROVIDE INCREASED SUPPORT ON MORE THAN YEAR-TO-YEAR BASIS WOULD SLOW DOWN INDO DESIRE BUY EXCESS EQUIPMENT AGAINST ANTICIPATED DAY OF FAMINE. CHIEF PROBLEMS ARE INSUFFICIENT TRAINED TECHNICIANS, SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL IN NAVY, LIMITED MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AIR FORCE, ARMY. PROBLEMS OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY CAN BE AIDED TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT BY ADDITIONAL MOBILE TRAINING PLUS SOME INCREASE IN MILTAG'S STAFF. SOVIETS, OF COURSE, UNCONCERNED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM, DO NOT RAISE QUESTIONS AS TO ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY.

FINALLY, PRIORITY OF INDO FOR DELIVERIES SHOULD NOW BE RAISED. PRESENT LONG LEAD TIMES SUGGEST INDO WELL DOWN ON LIST FOR PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING AUTHORITIES. IRRESPECTIVE OF REASONS THEREFOR, GREAT GAP BETWEEN EXPEDITED ARRIVAL BY AIR OF EQUIPMENT PLANNED IN FY 1958 AND THAT FOR SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEARS HAS CREATED DOUBT AMONG MILITARY LEADERS RE US INTENTIONS. AT PRESENT STAGE INDO UNABLE PLAN FAR AHEAD, WHICH MAKES QUICK RESPONSE TO THEIR REQUESTS IMPORTANT. CONTINUATION OF DELAY BETWEEN DECISION AND PERFORMANCE WILL FURTHER TEND INDUCE INDO RELIANCE ON SOVIET SOURCES SUPPLY.

MILITARY AID PROGRAM SO ADJUSTED IS ESSENTIAL IF US IS TO IMPROVE ITS LEVERAGE WITHIN INDO ARMED FORCES IN FACE SOVIET AID CAMPAIGN. MOST INDO MILITARY LEADERS WOULD PREFER US AID BUT IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ALONE WILL NOT INDUCE THEM TO REJECT SOVIET ALTERNATIVES.

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Air Pouch PRIORITY		OFFICIAL USE ONLY (Security Classification)	DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH		680	611 98/3-961
FROM :	Amembassy DJAKARTA	DESP. NO.	
TO :	THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.	DATE	March 9, 1961
REF :			MAR 15 1961

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	4-4	ARMY-2 NAVY-4 IO-4 EUR-5 ICA-11
	3/29	CAF-10 USIA-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-4 AIR-6 NSA-4

SUBJECT: A Press View of the Prospects for United States-Indonesian Relations

An article appearing in the March 1, 1961, English language Indonesian Observer (copies enclosed) written under a pseudonym by a non-staff member of the paper who is reputed to have "government connections," reflects a dichotomous attitude toward the United States held by many Indonesians. Such Indonesians, though hopeful for an improvement in Indonesian relations with the United States, and somewhat more optimistic that this can be achieved since the advent of the Kennedy administration, remain doubtful that such an improvement can be brought about. This is largely a result of narrow nationalism which is highly resistant to outside influences. Thus, the Observer article is quick to point out that the views of Sukarno and Kennedy on a number of major international problems are far apart, but almost in the next breath implies that an improvement may be in the offing as the United States appears "about to adopt a more realistic approach to world problems." This theme of alternate hope and despair concerning relations with the United States runs throughout the article. For example, Kennedy is generally pictured as responsive to the needs of the world situation (as seen through Indonesian eyes) and gratification is evident over the United States abandonment of its alleged "brinkmanship point of view: 'if you're not for us, you're against us'." However, the writer is concerned over the continued existence of factors which have had "an important bearing on United States Foreign Policy" (presumably to the disadvantage of the Indonesians) such as "the big time investors, diplomatic personnel in various Asian countries trained along the brinkmanship school (sic), the like minded journalists, or the planners in the...(Pentagon), and the Formosa lobby."

The article advances the thesis that President Kennedy's invitation to President Sukarno was prompted by Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles. In support of this, the author approvingly cites a number of Mr. Bowles' views toward Asian neutralism which appeared in his book Ambassador's Report and implies that such views have been instrumental in securing an invitation to Sukarno whose name, the author notes, "until recently, and maybe...still, sounds dissonant in many an ear in most capitals of the world." Furthermore, Kennedy's invitation to the Indonesian President is interpreted as a case of America's facing up to the realities of the principles advocated by Sukarno.

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Page 2 of
Encl. No. 680
Desp. No.
From Djakarta

The article concludes with a call for President Kennedy to "actively participate in solving the problems (of a changing world) in cooperation and coexistence with others, who, although adhering to different principles, do share a common aim: peace and prosperity for all...in the world."

However turgid and offensive the way in which the argument has been presented, it nevertheless represents a kind of plea for a new United States approach to the problem of colonialism, an approach not influenced by American interests in Europe. The Embassy believes this plea, and perhaps even its half hopeful, half despairing atmosphere, well reflects the views of many informed observers here - other than communists, of course.

For the Ambassador:

Rolland H. Bushner

Rolland H. Bushner
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

Enclosure:

Five copies of article from
Indonesian Observer, March 1, 1961,
entitled "Mr. Kennedy and The Ambassador's
Report"

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By GP NARA Date 8/4/00

Mr. Kennedy And The Ambassador's Report

(By: Ramawi)

 Enclosure No. 1 Despatch No. 680
 Dated March 9, 1961 from Jakarta,

IT was in August or September of 1951 that an American and his family came to pass a week or two in Indonesia, partly spend on holidays and partly on talking shop. They were mother, son and daughter.

During the very short time that they were in this country they tried very hard to collect the most favourable impressions which might be useful to understand the problems of a changing world. The head of this small family group responded to the name of Chester Bowles, former US ambassador to India. He was on his way home and to oblivion.

For it is only now almost seven years since September 1953 that he again shares the limelight but this time within arm's reach of US President John F. Kennedy. Chester Bowles wrote a book called "Ambassador's Report". This may have settled on this book by now been as it contained a too honest and frank recommendation on how to deal with a new Asia and a new generation of Asians. It was a kind of book not recommended for reading. But that was the past and now the author has come out of oblivion. It looks like that the tables are turned. It would have been no surprise to find in this instant scores of for instance US embassy officials racing through the pages of this book while this column strongly recommends it to those scholarly looking and sometimes backslapping and very young American journalists in this country who besides holding a Ph.D. degree from some famous US institute of high learning are also honour graduates of the science of brinkmanship. For the interest of this category of alien residents in an Asian country this column quotes the following paragraphs of the "Ambassador's Report".

Finally we must come to terms with the insistence of the new independent Asian countries that their foreign policies must be independent. In fact as well as deed. We can gain nothing and will lose much. If we insist on trying to budger or buy Asian governments into line. Our bewilderment and irritation in their position have grown to the point where many of us, including some in places of responsibility, have turned upon Asian countries with a snarling "If you're not for us, you're against us".

Chester Bowles continues: "Again, it makes little difference whether we are right or wrong, for no American argument or threat can change matters. The idea of non-involvement in the present world struggle is deeply held throughout most of Asia except Formosa and South Korea, and we will not make it go away by striking out blindly. We will gain far more by trying earnestly and patiently to understand it and the fears and realities on which it is based." So far Mr. Bowles and may this serve as an eye opener for those who professed to see things other than the realities

rea, and we will not make it go away by striking out blindly. We will gain far more by trying earnestly and patiently to understand it and the fears and realities on which it is based. So far Mr. Bowles and may this serve as an eye opener for those who professed to see things other than the realities

MR. KENNEDY'S INVITATION

This column dealt rather lengthily on Mr. Bowles and his writings because in this column's opinion it was Chester Bowles who prompted Mr. Kennedy to write out the invitation to President Soekarno. How the invitation came about or on what ground it was issued is to this column not of primary importance. Most important however is the fact that the incumbent Head of State of the Republic of Indonesia, in this case President Soekarno, has been invited to talk things over. Until recently and may be it still is, the sound of Soekarno's name was a dissonance in many an ear in most capitals in the Western world and in certain countries affiliated to the Western world. Let us see what Chester Bowles had to say about Soekarno: "If only America would really understand us," President Soekarno told me, "We are not primarily interested in your money although we need help."

What we want most is your understanding. We want you to believe in what we are trying to do. Our only aim is to become a successful democracy. We are not going to become communist, but we naturally cannot take direction from you or anyone else. We must have a forthright independence. It means everything to us." — Mr. Bowles also noted that Soekarno is no follower of India.

This column is of the opinion that inviting Soekarno means facing the realities or principles Soekarno adheres to of signals for. To agree extend the description Mr. Bowles gave of Soekarno still holds. Only the background has changed from liberal democracy to (successful) guided democracy. But even that has seemingly already been understood.

THE REALITIES AND PRINCIPLES

It seems obvious that Mr. Kennedy is fully aware of Mr. Soekarno's standpoint and principles, about colonialism, the organization of the UN as proposed by Mr. Soekarno in his UN speech of September 30 last year or any, forthcoming summit conference, on peaceful co-existence, or the disarmament problem. It could be safely stated that on all these subjects the points of view of both presidents at the moment stand in sharp contrast. For instance the UN organization, it has been a long felt necessity to bring about changes concerning the increased membership of Asian-African countries. It was thought to enlarge and to balance the membership of the security council, because the present composition does no longer reflect the real balance of power. Regarding summit meetings, if any, Indonesia has made it known that Asia and Africa cannot be longer neglected so that in future summit talks the representatives of these two continents should participate. About China, that is the People's Republic of China, Indonesia's stand couldn't be made clearer while on disarmament Indonesia has repeatedly decried that what it seeks is the preservation of world peace. Thus far Indonesia has been classified as being no longer indifferent in dealing with these issues. Fortunately however the start of Mr. Kennedy's tenure of office was marked by a new trend which is diametrically opposed to the brinkmanship point of view. "If you're not for us, you're against us." Such a reconsideration is very fortunate indeed, in the very first place to the USA itself. For this means that the USA is about to adopt a more realistic approach to the world problems. Such a change this column may say will only benefit Uncle Sam. The recipe for this change of attitude was prescribed by Mr. Bowles in his "Ambassador's Report". The recipe runs as follows: — "We achieve nothing by calling upon the free Asian nations for rescinding

mental stand in April 1951. For instance the UN organization, it has been a long felt necessity to bring about changes concerning the increased membership of Asian-African countries. It was thought to enlarge and to balance the membership of the security council, because the present composition does no longer reflect the real balance of power. Regarding summit meetings, if any, Indonesia has made it known that Asia and Africa cannot be longer neglected so that in future summit talks the representatives of these two continents should participate. About China, that is the People's Republic of China, Indonesia's stand couldn't be made clearer while on disarmament Indonesia has repeatedly decried that what it seeks is the preservation of world peace. Thus far Indonesia has been classified as being no longer indifferent in dealing with these issues. Fortunately however the start of Mr. Kennedy's tenure of office was marked by a new trend which is diametrically opposed to the brinkmanship point of view. "If you're not for us, you're against us." Such a reconsideration is very fortunate indeed, in the very first place to the USA itself. For this means that the USA is about to adopt a more realistic approach to the world problems. Such a change this column may say will only benefit Uncle Sam. The recipe for this change of attitude was prescribed by Mr. Bowles in his "Ambassador's Report". The recipe runs as follows: — "We achieve nothing by calling upon the free Asian nations for rescinding

mental statements which they can not back up by real power, and which, rightly or wrongly, they believe will involve them in issues which are no concern of theirs. We have much more to gain by patient effort to define the areas where our interests and theirs coincide and by concentrating our diplomacy and persuasion on obtaining their cooperation and indeed their leadership in safeguarding these interests". Indeed what sounds as a remedy to one is considered poison by others.

Does Mr. Kennedy realize this? He may have his most trusted advisers on foreign policy within his hand's reach, he may even earnestly try to live up to his and their wishes but the factors that have always had an important bearing on the US foreign policy for the past 8 years are still there, the big time investors, the diplomatic personnel in various Asian countries trained along the brinkmanship school of thought, the like-minded journalists or the planners in the star shaped and star shaped building across the Potomac river and the Fortnase Innby.

This category of people was traditionally or may be professionally opposed to the point of view that those who are not with us are not necessarily against us. This is the category of people that has sheltered the "Ambassador's Report" for the dust to settle on. This is a formidable reality in the immediate surrounding of Mr. Kennedy. A reality he has to face first and foremost, before putting the chips on the table.

This column's sympathy goes to Mr. Kennedy for it seems to be much easier for him to associate himself with the problems of a changing world as presented by Mr. Soekarno on various occasions and underlined by the "Ambassador's Report", while it looks like as if he has to display all his might to convince the masters of the science of brinkmanship that the realities they stand for belong to a bygone era, and that these realities today in fact are the greatest unrealities.

However, to associate oneself with problems is not enough.

One should actively participate in solving the problems of co-operation and co-existence with others, who, although adhering to different principles, do share a common aim: peace and prosperity for all and everything in this world.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2589, MARCH 10, 6 PM

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EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2536

INR

RMR

I HAVE SUSPECTED FOR SOME TIME NAVY CHIEF MARTADINATA HAS BEEN HARBORING SOME KIND OF GRIEVANCE RE US, AND DURING COURSE MORE THAN ONE HOUR MEETING MARCH 10 TO INTRODUCE NEW CHIEF MILTAG HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE BASIC PROBLEMS BOTHERING HIM AND HIS STAFF. IRRITANTS NOT COMPLETELY VALID IN ALL CASES AND THEY WILL TEND TO DECREASE WITH TIME AS MILTAG CONTINUES WORKING WITH ALRI.

BURDEN MARTADINATA COMPLAINTS IS:

1. ALRI BELIEVES US HAS IN PAST FAVORED ARMY OVER NAVY AT TIMES.
2. ALRI CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY EMB UNABLE TO GIVE ANSWER IN PRINCIPLE ON REQUESTS FOR CHANGES IN ASSISTANCE OR APPROVAL FOR MS/MS SALES WITHOUT LONG DELAYS.
3. ALRI CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY SALES CONTRACT CANNOT BE CONCLUDED HERE INSTEAD OF THROUGH INDO EMBASSY DC.
4. ALRI HAS FEELING THAT AID IS UNILATERALLY HANDLED BY CINCPAC AND WASHINGTON RATHER THAN THROUGH MUTUAL AGREEMENT WITH ALRI.

THIS FIRST TIME

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OFFICE SYMBOL	<i>M. M. M. M.</i>	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	<i>File</i>

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-2- 2589, MARCH 10, 6 PM, FROM DJAKARTA

THIS FIRST TIME I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DRAW MARTADINATA OUT ON THESE SUBJECT. AS RESULT WAS ABLE TO REASSURE HIM OF CONTINUED US INTEREST AND TO INDICATE THAT PAST MISUNDERSTANDINGS ARE BEING CORRECTED. WE POINTED OUT AS EXAMPLES EARLY TRANSFER OF ALBATROS AIRCRAFT AND CONCURRENT ARRIVAL MTT, SALE AND TRANSFER TWO LSTS AND CURRENT APPROVAL FOR PURCHASE 5,000 RIFLES. WHILE I BELIEVE THAT MANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS WERE CLARIFIED AS RESULT THIS MEETING MARTADINATA'S POSITION CLEARLY SUPPORTS BASIC PROPOSALS MADE IN REFTEL REGARDING NECESSITY TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO ALRI REQUIREMENTS BY QUICKLY GIVING YES OR NO ANSWERS TO REQUESTS AND THE REQUIREMENT TO DISCUSS WITH ALRI A LONG-RANGE PROGRAM. ADMIRAL SAID DELIVERY TIMES ON AGREED ITEMS NOT A MAJOR ISSUE WITH ALRI, PERHAPS BECAUSE MARTADINATA HAS CONCEPT OF LEAD TIMES. MORE IMPORTANT IS KNOWLEDGE THAT US WILL PROVIDE ULTIMATE SUPPORT IN SPECIFIC ITEMS SO THAT ALRI CAN PLAN TRAINING AND SUPPORT.

COMMENT:

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION PLUS POSSIBLE LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN INDO EMBASSY ABILITY TO HANDLE MS/MS SALES REQUESTS SEEM BACK OF ALRI DESIRE TO STAFF SALES HERE RATHER THAN IN WASHINGTON. EMBASSY DOUBTS MARTADINATA'S PROPOSAL PRACTICABLE IN THIS RESPECT.

JONES

WP

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REF :			B/EC-3 B/FAC-3 <i>Noted</i>		B/CEA-1 S/P-1 S/O-1 <i>Section Page 3</i>
	19 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION FE-4 REC'D 3-23	DEPT. IN F OTHER	R711A-7 I-4 CU-5 <i>3/30/61</i>	INR-7 ICA-11 <i>24/12/60-1</i>
		SUBJECT: Masjumi Activities and Attitudes Concerning Aspects of United States Policy Toward Indonesia			

SUMMARY

A leader of one of the largest anti-communist youth organizations in Indonesia (Indonesian Moslem Youth Movement - GPII) voiced his approval and that of his associates over President Kennedy's recent invitation to Sukarno, though the reporting officer originally assumed that disapproval would be forthcoming from these circles on the grounds that the invitation would enhance Sukarno's prestige within Indonesia. This leader's position on the matter was based on the belief that a display of solicitude toward Sukarno would increase American prestige here and a corollary of such a development would be ~~the~~ a strengthening of the anti-communist position in Indonesia. In a similar vein, he pleaded for United States support of Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea, and expressed the view that such an American move would effect a radical change in the Indonesian political picture which would favor local anti-communist forces. He noted that all educated Indonesians, regardless of party, were unanimous in their support of the Indonesian Government's claim to West New Guinea.

The source revealed that the outlawed Masjumi party was still engaged in political activity and, with the connivance of friendly military authorities, was utilizing the organizational structure of the Indonesian GPII as a cover for meetings on party affairs. He further commented on the dearth of political activity on the eve of Sukarno's departure on a world tour and contrasted this with the political maneuverings which characterized the situation immediately prior to Sukarno's departure on a similar excursion last year.

* * * *

Some interesting information regarding the activities of the banned Masjumi party and the attitudes of anti-communist Indonesians toward certain aspects of United States policy concerning Indonesia were revealed on March 12 during the course of a surprise visit to the house of the reporting officer by Mr. Ali UNDAJA, former President of the Indonesian Moslem Students Union (PII - Masjumi high school students) and now a member of the Central Board of the Indonesian Moslem Youth Movement (GPII - Masjumi youth organization). During the course of the discussion Mr. Undaja, whom the reporting officer had met

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briefly only once before at an Embassy Labor Day reception last September, took pains to emphasize he hoped that a form of useful cooperation between Indonesian anti-communists and the United States could be achieved. It is thus possible that he had been designated by the GPII to sound out the Embassy regarding financial or other assistance for this group. Despite this possible circumstance surrounding the visit, and despite the existence of language difficulties, the reporting officer was impressed with the openness, intelligence and personality of the young Mr. Undaja (about thirty years old).

The conversation first touched on the activities of the GPII for which Mr. Undaja claimed a membership of about 2 million throughout Indonesia. He disclosed that the organization was not as active this year as it had been over the past years but related this situation to the overall decline of political activities in Indonesia. In this connection, he contrasted the virtual absence of rumors concerning plots, counter-plots and political maneuvering on the eve of another Sukarno orbit around the world with the vastly different situation existing immediately prior to the President's departure last year on a similar excursion. He readily agreed with the reporting officer's observation that it was virtually certain no Democratic League type of organization would be formed during the President's forthcoming absence. However, neither the decline in activities nor the disfavor with which the government viewed the Masjumi and its affiliates had resulted in a decline of GPII numerical strength which he termed stationary over the past few years. Furthermore, he observed that the GPII's central board was still meeting quite frequently, on the average of twice a week on an informal basis and once a month on a formal basis; the latter being distinguished from the former by a request to military authorities for permission to hold a meeting. The reporting officer is of the opinion that the frequency of meetings is largely due to the well developed Indonesian fondness for convening and attending committee meetings.

Mr. Undaja then claimed that the outlawed Masjumi party was still active in political affairs and that the existing network of the GPII was utilized by the Masjumi leadership as a transmission belt to make their views on ~~xx~~ certain matters known to the Masjumi regional membership. In practice, the GPII regional branches ~~xxxx~~ found excuses for meetings, such as the convocation of perhaps a symposium on cultural affairs or "the Indonesian identity," at which the major business at hand would actually be the discussion of Masjumi policy and affairs. Permission for these "symposiums" was readily forthcoming from the military authorities who, in fact, were well aware of the true purpose of the meetings. In some instances, Mr. Undaja noted, the police had attempted to deny permission for the meetings but they were easily overruled by the Army.

One recent example of this Masjumi activity, according to Mr. Undaja, was a directive to party members to turn down seats in the newly constituted regional legislatures despite cases of Army generosity in awarding this anti-communist force places in the functional sector of the legislatures. He explained party policy in this matter as arising from the complete unwillingness

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of the party to associate itself in any form with the present government. He claimed that as a consequence the vast majority of Masjumi members who had been offered seats had rejected them, though he admitted to some defections arising from the economic need of the designees for the salary attached to the position.

President Kennedy's recent invitation to Sukarno came up as a topic of conversation and the reporting officer was somewhat surprised to learn that Mr. Undaja and his anti-communist associates welcomed this United States move. It was half expected that the guest would voice displeasure over the invitation on the grounds that a meeting with the President of the United States would further enhance Sukarno's prestige within Indonesia. On the contrary, Mr. Undaja was of the opinion that display of solicitude toward Sukarno would increase American prestige in Indonesia and a corollary of such a development would be a strengthening of the anti-communist position in Indonesia. In a similar vein, he pleaded for United States support for Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea. Prefacing his remarks with the observation that the Indonesian Government's stand on West Guinea received the unanimous backing of all educated Indonesians regardless of party (he parenthetically noted that the masses were not even remotely concerned with the issue), he claimed that a shift in American policy on this question would effect a radical change in the Indonesian political picture. The Soviet position here would be undercut by this American move, he continued, and that of the United States would be greatly strengthened. This development was naturally viewed as having a benign effect on the position of anti-communist groups in Indonesia. Mr. Undaja was fully aware of the factors involved in present American policy, and the difficulties that would face Indonesia in administering the vast undeveloped West New Guinea territory. Thus, he expressed understanding that the need for Western European unity in the face of the Soviet threat could influence the United States position on the issue and even conceded that the Papuans may not wish to find themselves under Indonesian control; but to the Indonesians, himself included, West New Guinea was not a matter of the mind, and emotion overruled all other considerations.

For the Ambassador:

Rolland H. Bushner
Rolland H. Bushner

Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

Dept pass to: Medan, Surabaya, Canberra

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Dear Paul:

I was happy to receive your letter of March 8, 1961 concerning our policy in Indonesia.

As you know, this policy is undergoing review and re-thinking and our specific point of departure has been the series of policy telegrams from Ambassador Jones. The imminent visit of President Sukarno is an additional element which gives a degree of urgency to these deliberations.

Your comments on Ambassador Jones' recommendations are very welcome in that we are assured that your office and mine are working along similar lines.

We hope soon to be in a position to seek your comment on certain specific proposals with respect to Indonesia.

Sincerely yours,

J. Graham Parsons

Mr. Paul H. Nitze,
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs,
Department of Defense.

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Assistant Secretary of Defense
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